Fines Are Not a Budget-Filling Tool: State Agencies Must Not Profit from Penalties

Fines Are Not a Budget-Filling Tool: State Agencies Must Not Profit from Penalties

One of the most fundamental problems that has been causing debate for many years in the system of ensuring the rule of law and establishing order in society — the issue of state regulatory bodies having a direct financial interest in fine revenues — has come into the public spotlight. According to the principles of a state governed by law, administrative or financial penalty measures must never serve as a «source of income» or a plan to fill the system's budget for a state organization; instead, they must serve solely and exclusively as a means of crime prevention, prophylaxis, and warning to society.

If the development fund, employee salaries, or bonuses of a specific ministry, committee, or inspection are formed directly from the share of collected fines, a dangerous imbalance arises in the system — a financial interest trap to artificially increase violations and fulfill a «fine plan» instead of reducing them.

Well, why does such an interest become the main hotbed of corruption and abuse, which mechanisms can return fines to a preventive tool, and how is the financing of state bodies regulated in international practice?

«Financial Hunt Instead of Prevention»: Key Conflicts in the System

The most important risks and arguments pointed out by specialists and public representatives:

  • Distortion of Purpose and Essence: The original philosophy of a fine was to educate a citizen through punishment, but if an agency begins to derive income from it, prevention and awareness-raising work are relegated to the background;

  • «Plan» and Hidden Pressure: Wherever there is a financial interest, an obligation to fulfill certain indicators («plans») arises, which paves the way for finding artificial accusations against ordinary citizens and entrepreneurs;

  • Atmosphere of Distrust: Citizens begin to perceive the state agency not as a system protecting them, but rather as a controller «reaching into their pockets»;

  • The Correct Model — Full State Budget: All regulatory and punitive bodies must be financed exclusively from the republican budget in a strictly established manner, and all collected fines must be channeled without exception into the general budget;

  • Change of Performance Criteria (KPI): The effectiveness of a state agency must be evaluated not by the billions of fines collected, but by how much the number of violations committed in the region has decreased.

Analysis of the Fine System: Comparison of Interest and Preventive Approach

Comparison of systemic risks and healthy legal mechanisms:

Indicators and Criteria

Fine-Interested System (Risky Approach)

Prevention-Based System (Healthy Legal State)

Main Goal of the Agency

Collect more fines and enrich the fund

Bring the number of violations close to zero

Employee Motivation

Percentage of collected amounts (bonuses)

Establishment of order and reduction of problems in the region (KPI)

Attitude Towards Citizens

Immediate imposition of fines for every mistake

Initial warning, explanation, and creation of conditions

Destination of Fine Funds

Internal fund / special account of the organization

Directly to the State Budget (Treasury)

Consequence in Society

Dissatisfaction of the population and business, risk of corruption

Trust in state bodies and high legal culture

Legal and Economic Expertise: Where Should Reforms Begin?

Key conclusions of public activists and industry analysts:

  • Severing Financial Ties: First of all, the practice of the Traffic Safety Department, tax, ecology, and various state inspections receiving a share of collected fines must be completely abolished at the legislative level;

  • Obligation to Create Conditions: Before imposing a fine, the state must give the citizen an opportunity not to violate the rule (for example, issuing fines for parking without building parking lots is considered unfair);

  • Decent Provision from the Budget: Decent and high salaries for regulatory personnel provided from the state treasury, rather than depending on fines, will curb the risk of corruption;

  • International Experience: In developed countries, police officers or inspectors do not receive a single penny from the amount of fines; on the contrary, leaders of regions where the number of fines has sharply decreased are awarded the highest honors.

Disconnecting state agencies from the fine market is the only correct way to establish genuine justice in society and increase respect for the laws.

In your opinion, if state agencies stop taking a share of fines, will order improve on the streets and in various fields, or will control weaken? Do you think it is time to evaluate the work of regulatory bodies not by the number of fines, but by the prevention of violations? Leave your personal opinions in the comments and share this analytical article, which is extremely relevant to society, with all your friends and groups on social media!

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